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CHINA’S PRAGMATIST EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY:
HU SHIH’S PRAGMATISM AND DEWEY’S INFLUENCE IN
CHINA
SOR-HOON TAN
Abstract: In the 1920s, John Dewey’s followers in China, led by his student Hu
Shih, attempted to put his pragmatism into practice in their quest for democracy.
This essay compares Hu Shih’s thought, especially his emphasis on pragmatism as
method, with Dewey’s philosophical positions and evaluates Hu’s achievement as
a pragmatist in the context of the tumultuous times he lived in. It assesses Hu’s
claim that the means to democracy lies in education rather than politics, since
democracy as a way of life requires a cultural renewal beyond institutional
changes. It argues that a problem-centered approach to social change does not
preclude radical action, even revolution. But pragmatism is against gratuitous use
of violence in the service of wholesale and abstract ideals advocated by various
‘‘isms.’’ While Hu’s experiment of democracy in China is a signiﬁcant episode in
the history of pragmatism, its ‘‘failure’’ does not prove that there are inherent
ﬂaws in the pragmatist method, that pragmatism is unviable for China. The
failure needs to be understood in the context of the pragmatist conception of
experiment, in which failures are to be expected; what is important is to learn
from them to achieve better results in the next stage of inquiry. Hu Shih’s
pragmatism contains lessons for pragmatists and for those interested in the
continued quest for democracy in ChinaFthe experiment continues.
Keywords: Hu Shih, John Dewey, democracy, China, May Fourth movement,
method, educational reforms, Chinese pragmatism.
The ‘‘Dewey Experiment’’ in China
The pragmatist John Dewey was ‘‘generally admitted to be the leading
living philosopher of America,’’ according to Bertrand Russell’s
assessment in the 1940s (Russell 1984, 774). Dewey’s inﬂuence also
spread beyond the shores of America. He spent about twenty-six months
in China, from May 1919 to July 1921, during a time of great turmoil for
the early Chinese republic. Barry Keenan’s The Dewey Experiment in
China: Educational Reform and Political Power in the Early Republic
provides us with an engaging and meticulously detailed account of this
encounter between John Dewey and modern China, ‘‘one of the most
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fascinating episodes in the intellectual history of twentieth-century
China’’ (Keenan 1977, v). During his visit, ‘‘Dewey became a fad’’ in
China (Keenan 1977, 34). But in Keenan’s view, the ‘‘Dewey experiment
in China’’ nevertheless proved the inapplicability of Dewey’s idea.
The ‘‘best’’ the United States had to offer through John Dewey had severe
limitations in China. ‘‘Chastened’’ Wilsonism, progressive educational reform,
and the experimental political theory that his followers promoted all largely
failed, in appeal and efﬁcacyFand for good reasons. [Keenan 1977, 156–57;
see also Smith 1985 and Ching 1985]
Chinese interest in pragmatism declined rapidly after the 1920s. Dewey’s
philosophy was intermittently attacked by both the left and the right, for
opposite reasons. Dewey and Hu Shih (1891–1962), the main proponent
of Dewey’s works in China, have often been targets of ideological warfare
rather than subjects of serious scholarship on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits. But the tide seems to be turning.1 Recent resurgence of interest in
Hu Shih’s works shows more intellectual rigor and less ideologically
motivated praise or blame. In the People’s Republic of China itself, some
scholars are beginning to reexamine the lessons the ‘‘Dewey experiment’’
has for China (Sun 2002; Gu 2000). Across the Paciﬁc, Roger Ames and
David Hall’s works comparing Dewey and Confucius in relation to the
prospects of democracy in China has generated some thought-provoking
comparative philosophy.2
The last word has not been written on the Dewey-China encounter. In
addition to the renewed prospects of Deweyan pragmatism engaging
Chinese philosophical traditions and practice productively, it is worth
taking another look at the historical encounter itself. Building on the
excellent historical scholarship that already exists, it is time for closer
scrutiny of the philosophical issues involved in the Dewey experiment.
How did Dewey’s Chinese followers understand his pragmatism? Is the
1 Hu Shih (1891–1962) was one of the most well-known and inﬂuential Chinese thinkers
in the twentieth century, not only in Asia, but also in the West, where he spent several years
of his life, ﬁrst as a student, later as a diplomat and scholar. While his works, both literary
and philosophical, have been the subject of active research among Chinese scholars both
before and after his death, studies in English devoted to his philosophical thought have been
surprisingly few, given his fame. Though he is invariably mentioned in works on twentieth-
century Chinese intellectual history and works on the May Fourth movement, Jerome
Grieder’s 1970 intellectual biography, recently re-issued in 2001, is still the only scholarly
effort in English that pays Hu’s thought the kind of attention it deserves.
2 Hall and Ames 1997, 1999; Tan, 2003. In April 2002, Larry Hickman organized a
seminar on Pragmatism and Confucianism in Boston, bringing together prominent scholars
from both areas for philosophical dialogue. Later, in October 2002, Hickman, Michael
Eldridge, William Gavin, and Herman Saatkamp were among the scholars invited to a
Conference on ‘‘Tendency of Philosophy: A Sino-American Dialogue,’’ hosted by the Fudan
University in Shanghai, China. Among the colloquium papers given at the 2003 American
Philosophical Association (Paciﬁc Division) meeting was one on ‘‘Dewey and Confucius: On
Moral Education.’’
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pragmatism they try to apply in the Chinese context different from other
pragmatisms? Is it even pragmatism? If pragmatism was really ‘‘tested’’ in
China in the 1920s, what lessons does the episode have for pragmatism,
for China? Could we rescue pragmatist philosophy from the ﬂaws
revealed, or does the episode spell out the limits of pragmatism, even the
limits of philosophy? Is pragmatism still relevant today in China and the
rest of Asia?
One single essay obviously cannot answer all these questions. I
propose to discuss only the thought of Hu Shih, who was most closely
associated with Dewey and was acknowledged as the foremost advocate
of Dewey’s pragmatism in China.3 Hu himself claimed that Dewey’s
philosophy ‘‘became a guide in his life and thought and the foundation of
his own philosophy’’ (1996, 4:453).4 A comprehensive analysis of Hu’s
thought will not be possible here; my evaluation of Hu’s pragmatism and
China’s pragmatist experiment in democracy will focus on Hu’s emphasis
on method and his adaptation of Dewey’s philosophy to democratize
China. I shall conclude with some reﬂections on pragmatism’s viability
and the continued quest for democracy in China.
Pragmatism as Method
In an entry dated 9 May 1915, in his Diaries While Studying Abroad, Hu
Shih summarized the pragmatic theory of truth and noted its emphasis on
consequences. Hu was impressed by the pragmatist assertion that ‘‘there
is no absolute truth, only particular truths’’ meaningful in speciﬁc
judgments and always subject to reevaluation in the light of fresh
experience; ‘‘thought is but the means of solving various problems . . . the
means of staying in an environment and it changes with the environment;
in thinking, instead of clinging to any pre-given universal theory, one
must seek the practical and useful’’ (Hu 2000, 450–51).5 Once he had
accepted this pragmatist position, Hu paid scant attention to epistemo-
logical debates Western philosophers delight in. What would occupy a
central position in his thinking and practice in the years to come was
actual application of Dewey’s method of thinking.
Hu Shih found the ‘‘practical philosophy’’ he was looking for in
Dewey’s pragmatism. His 1919 lecture introducing pragmatism (Hu 1996,
3 Dubs 1938, 350. This opinion is shared by many others, some cited in Grieder 1970,
121. On Dewey’s inﬂuence on Hu Shih, both Grieder and Keenan gave details of Dewey and
Hu’s relationship before and during Dewey’s visit. Keenan (1977, 23–29) pointed out Hu
and Dewey’s mutual inﬂuence on each other during Dewey’s visit. Grieder (1970, 117)
discussed other inﬂuences that had already formed Hu’s intellectual disposition before his
meeting with Dewey’s pragmatism; these probably also affected Hu’s interpretation and
practice of Dewey’s pragmatism. Like Dewey’s encounter with China, the philosophical
relationship between him and Hu Shih is not unilateral or straightforward.
4 All citations from Hu’s Chinese works are in my translation unless otherwise stated.
5 This is the earliest mention of pragmatism in Hu Shih’s published writings.
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1:233) refers approvingly to Dewey’s comment that ‘‘philosophy recovers
itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of
philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for
dealing with the problems of men’’ (Dewey 1976–83, 10:46).6 The
problem that preoccupied Hu throughout his life was the future of China
and its people. Hu decided very early that what China urgently needed was
‘‘not novel theories or profound philosophical doctrines, but methods to
seek knowledge, discuss affairs, observe things, and manage the country’’
(Hu 2000, 89). In his own words, when he ‘‘later followed the intellectual
paths of Huxley and Dewey it was because since youth [he] had placed
such great emphasis on the method of thinking’’ (Hu 1998, 84). Dewey’s
views on the process of thought were extremely important in the
development of Hu’s intellectual method. And much of Hu’s life was
devoted to the social inquiry that Dewey argued has to be at the center of
democratic life, even though the inquiry was necessarily imperfect given
the circumstances, and Hu was inclined to a more individualistic view of
inquiry than was warranted by Dewey’s conception of democracy.7
In anticipation of Dewey’s visit to China in 1919, Hu Shih gave four
lectures on pragmatism, which were published in Beijing’s leading
journals. Later in the year, he published three other articles on Dewey’s
philosophy and educational theory. These seven articles subsequently
appeared under the title Experimentalism (shiyan zhuyi, ), Hu’s
preferred translation of ‘‘pragmatism.’’8 Though instrumentalism is much
more in vogue now, Joseph Ratner pointed out that ‘‘experimentalism is
one of two basic terms Dewey has used to designate his philosophy’’
(Ratner 1939, 58; see also Dewey 1976–83, 12:220; Dewey 1981–91, 2:3–
20). In his ﬁrst mention of pragmatism as a student, Hu had used the
translation shixiao zhuyi, , in which shixiao means ‘‘practical
consequences’’ (Hu 2000, 450). Today, the more common Chinese
translation of ‘‘pragmatism’’ is shiyong zhuyi, , emphasizing
practical use (shiyong) (Bunnin and Yu 2001, 789). Hu noted that the
Japanese translated pragmatism as jisai shugi, , pronounced shiji
zhuyi in Mandarin, emphasizing the actual or practical (jisai, shiji),
6 Hu cites this same passage in a later work, ‘‘World Philosophies of the Last Fifty
Years’’ (Hu 1996, 2: 267). In an entry dated 25 January 1914, Hu listed ‘‘practical
philosophy’’ as one of three questions he was concerned with (Hu 2000, 90; see also Grieder
1970, 47).
7 Hu Shih’s individualism is an interesting topic that unfortunately cannot be taken up
here due to constraints of space. This might not be so much a departure from Deweyan
pragmatism as a compensation for an overemphasis on community at the expense of
individuality in China, relative to the context of Dewey’s criticism of individualism in
America.
8 The seven articles in Experimentalism are: ‘‘Preface,’’ ‘‘C. S. Peirce: The Founder of
Pragmatism,’’ ‘‘William James’s Psychology,’’ ‘‘James on Pragmatism,’’ ‘‘Basic Ideas in
John Dewey’s Philosophy,’’ ‘‘Dewey on Thinking,’’ and ‘‘Dewey’s Philosophy of
Education’’ (Hu 1996, 1:212–49).
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whereas his own translation (shiyan means ‘‘experiment’’) not only
emphasizes practical results but also highlights ‘‘what this philosophy
pays the most attention to, the method of experiment’’ (Hu 1996, 1:212).
In his lecture on C. S. Peirce, Hu Shih traced the origins of pragmatism
to Peirce’s article ‘‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’’ (Peirce 1878). To Hu,
‘‘the central tenet of pragmatism is to seek a method to make the
meanings of all our ideas clear’’ (1996, 1:217). Hu concluded that Peirce’s
pragmatism is ‘‘a scientist’s uniﬁcation of theory and practice.’’ For not
only is the meaning of an idea its conceivable consequences, ‘‘the
meaning of any idea is the habit that the idea directs us to cultivate’’
(1996, 1:218). Through the formation of appropriate habits, scientiﬁc
method, ‘‘the laboratory attitude of mind,’’ will produce true beliefs and
right conduct.
Hu Shih’s understanding of ‘‘pragmatism’’ is further revealed by two
nineteenth-century developments he singled out as crucial to the genesis
of this ‘‘new philosophy.’’ One is the change from viewing ‘‘scientiﬁc
laws’’ as absolute truths to viewing them as useful hypotheses to be
revised in the light of new experienceFthis is the ‘‘experimental
method.’’ The second is Darwin’s theory of evolution. ‘‘Species evolve
as a result of adapting to the environment. Truth is but an instrument for
dealing with the environment. Once the environment changes, truth will
change correspondingly.’’ According to Hu, the pragmatist application of
Darwinian evolutionism to philosophy produced the ‘‘genetic method,’’
which studies how and why something came about in order to understand
what it is (Hu 1996, 1:213–16).9 In ‘‘The Inﬂuence of Darwinism on
Philosophy,’’ Dewey himself anticipated a transformation of philosophy by
‘‘the Darwinian genetic and experimental logic’’ (Dewey 1976–83, 4:13).
To Hu Shih, ‘‘pragmatism is but the scientiﬁc method applied to
philosophy’’ (Hu 1996, 1:216). This is not too far from Dewey’s own
insistence that ‘‘pragmatism is content to take its stand with science,’’
which subjects everything to ‘‘description and inquiry’’ (Dewey 1976–83,
10:39). Richard Rorty, while acknowledging that ‘‘Dewey never stopped
talking about ‘scientiﬁc method,’ ’’ insisted that ‘‘he never had anything
very useful to say about it’’ (Saatkamp 1995, 94; Rorty 1991). In contrast,
Joseph Ratner (1939, 4), in a long introduction to a volume of Dewey’s
selected works under the title Intelligence in the Modern World,
highlighted that Dewey’s basic position emphasized the relevance of the
scientiﬁc method to philosophy. More recently, Michael Eldridge (1998,
9 During a farewell speech at the end of Dewey’s visit, Hu again explained
‘‘pragmatism’’ in terms of ‘‘the genetic method’’ and ‘‘the experimental method’’ (Hu
1996, 1:277–78). There is some indication that Dewey actually treated the experimental
method and the genetic method as one rather than two methods (1976–83, 2:4). More
research is required to assess whether Hu overemphasized the inﬂuence of evolution theory
on Dewey’s philosophy, as a result of his own strong afﬁliation to Darwinism (Grieder 1970,
27–28, 211).
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14) took up ‘‘Rorty’s challenge to present a coherent, interesting account
of Dewey’s ‘scientiﬁc’ method’’ with examples and explication of
‘‘intelligent practice’’ demonstrating how Dewey’s method of inquiry,
which is a generalized scientiﬁc method, could ‘‘transform experience.’’
What distinguishes human from other animal life is this intelligence: ‘‘the
use of causes as means to achieve desired consequences, where one is
cognizant of a causal relationship and understands its potential for
satisfying some felt need’’ (Eldridge 1998, 17). ‘‘To Dewey, thinking, in
other words, is the intentional endeavor to discover speciﬁc connections
between something which we do and the consequences which result, so
that the two become continuous’’ (Dewey 1976–83, 9:152). Hu Shih,
explaining Dewey’s views on thinking, singles out ‘‘the cultivation of
creative intelligence’’ as ‘‘the greatest aim of Dewey’s philosophy’’ (Hu
1996, 1:234); it is creative intelligence that will enable human beings to
respond satisfactorily to their environments, both physical and social. In
his own way, Hu tried to realize Dewey’s scientiﬁc method as intelligent
practice, to transform his own experience and his country’s.
According to Hu Shih, ‘‘the purpose of science is to give us the method
of various reasonable behavior, so that our faith in such method may
produce reasonable habits’’ (Hu 1996, 1:218). By viewing the scientiﬁc
method as a general method of thinking, Hu believed that science could
solve moral and political problems. These sentiments echo those in
Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philosophy. Dewey also believed that
philosophy has much to learn from modern science, and that the lesson
would improve philosophy’s ability to handle what should be its central
task, solving the problems of humanity, especially moral and social
problems. There is some justice in Rorty’s accusation that Dewey treated
‘‘the scientiﬁc method’’ as synonymous with ‘‘reﬂective thinking’’ (Dewey
1981–91, 8: xii; cf. Hickman 1995, 75). Dewey did advocate that we
‘‘generalize the experimental side of natural science into a logical method
which is applicable to the interpretation and treatment of social
phenomena’’ (1981–91, 8:11). More particularly, Dewey considered
science a source of moral theory (1981–91, 7:179). ‘‘It is one thing to
point out the need and meaning of a moral society, it is another thing to
bring such a society into being’’; solving social and moral problems of the
age is an important task for the scientiﬁc method (1976–83, 5:156).10
Dewey did not recommend that we simply apply the procedures and
ﬁndings of physical sciences in dealing with social problems; he
recommended that social inquiry ‘‘develop its own regulative ideas and
10 In a very early (1887) work, ‘‘Ethics and Physical Science’’ (1967–72, 1:205–26),
Dewey denied that physical science could provide the foundations of ‘‘the ethics of the
coming men.’’ His views of both science and ethics obviously went through some change in
his very long career. On other discussions of the application of the scientiﬁc method to
human affairs, see chapter 3 of Liberalism and Social Action, in 1981–91, 11: 41–65; chapter
6 in Freedom and Culture, in 1981–91, 13:156–72.
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standards,’’ so that we may acquire powers of directing the social
environment, of reconstructing our society (1981–91, 4: 86 and 6: 55); but
these powers cannot be exactly the same as the powers science has
acquired over our physical environment, given that society is constituted
by human agents rather than objects. Dewey explicitly objected to an
‘‘absolutist logic’’ that attempts to assimilate human sciences to physical
sciences (1981–91, 2:358–60). He maintained, as late as 1949, that ‘‘what
is needed is not the carrying over of procedures that have approved
themselves in physical science, but new methods as adapted to human
issues and problems’’ (1981–91, 16:379). Hu Shih was not misreading or
misapplying Dewey when he defended the relevance of science to life,
includingFand perhaps especiallyFits moral and political aspects; but
he was less sensitive than Dewey to the dangers of worshiping the
achievements of the physical sciences, because he believed that China’s
backwardness rendered it much more in need of the beneﬁts of science
than at risk from science’s evils (Hu 1996, 2:142). This does not mean that
he would not have agreed with Dewey’s clariﬁcation that there are
important differences between physical sciences and social sciences.
However, by taking such nuances of Dewey’s views for granted and not
qualifying his promotion of science, Hu made himself more vulnerable to
charges of ‘‘scientism.’’11
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s Impressions of Travels in Europe, written soon after
World War I, had declared the ‘‘bankruptcy of European science,’’
blaming the ‘‘materialistic and mechanistic’’ philosophy of the scientists
for the degradations of European life after the war, even for the war
itself. ‘‘The dream of the omnipotence of science’’ had destroyed man’s
faith, eroded his moral ﬁber, and denied his spirituality (Liang 1941, 10–
12). Carsun Chang (1997) followed with a lecture at Qinghua University
in 1923 claiming that science cannot solve the problems of the
‘‘philosophy of life’’; rather such a philosophy is required to judge the
appropriateness of adopting science. The battle was quickly joined by
others who agreed with them and those who defended the value of science
in ‘‘reconstructing’’ or ‘‘saving’’ China. In his preface to the collection of
contributions to this debate, Hu Shih (1997) complained that only one
participant, Wu Zhihui (1997), bothered to deﬁne clearly what a
‘‘scientiﬁc philosophy of life’’ is: the materialistic and mechanistic
11 Dewey’s more nuanced views became explicit in his writings only after his China visit,
so perhaps Hu Shih was not aware of them when promoting science in the early 1920s. Lin
Yu-sheng (1979, chapter 5) considered both Dewey and Hu Shih ‘‘scientistic’’; cf. Grieder’s
(1970, 151–58) more sympathetic view of Hu’s promotion of science. Rorty (1991, 63) also
considered the strand of pragmatism emphasizing experimental method scientistic; cf. Larry
Hickman’s (1995) exposition of Dewey’s views on the applicability of scientiﬁc method,
addressing recent criticisms of Dewey’s ‘‘scientism’’ that misunderstand Dewey.
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worldview Liang attacked.12 For the most part, Hu seemed less troubled
about this ‘‘materialistic and mechanistic’’ view than Dewey would have
been.
A fairer assessment of Hu’s promotion of science should take into
account the pragmatist rejection of dualisms, such as material versus
spiritual, mind versus matter/body, determinism versus liberty. Material
for Hu is ‘‘not dead but alive, not static but dynamic’’ (Hu 1997, 24), and
all cultures combine both the material and the spiritual. ‘‘Spiritual
civilization must be built on material foundations. Raising people’s
enjoyment of material things, improving their material conveniences
and comforts, will lead to the liberation of human abilities, so that they
need not devote all their strengths and thoughts to mere survival. This
enables them to have a reservoir of strength to satisfy their spiritual needs
and desires’’ (Hu 1996, 3: 2). Though the ten tenets summarizing Hu’s
outline of a new scientiﬁc philosophy of life (Hu 1997, 23–24), which
‘‘extended and added’’ to Wu’s ‘‘materialistic and mechanistic’’ deﬁni-
tion, may be problematic in themselves as well as questionable from a
broader pragmatist viewpoint, they were not devoid of morality or
spirituality.
Hu Shih described this worldview as a ‘‘naturalistic philosophy of life’’
without explaining the switch to the new terminology. Dewey himself
commented more than once on the relation between materialism and
naturalism, rejecting the former terminology because of its implied
‘‘metaphysical theory of substance’’ and because it has been ‘‘determined
by opposition to the psychical and mental as spiritual’’ (1981–91, 14:86;
see also 1981–91, 15:46–62, 109–26). In Dewey’s view, materialism loses
its meaning for philosophy when this antithetical position is abandoned.
Hu’s defense of science is grounded on similar rejection of such dualisms.
It is not surprising that his preface to Science and the Philosophy of Life
should conclude by asserting that a naturalistic philosophy of life, based
on science, ‘‘is nevertheless not without beauty, the poetic, moral
responsibilities, and the opportunities to employ fully one’s creative
intelligence’’ (Hu 1997, 25). Science, and the scientiﬁc method in
particular, enables us to act on the basis of knowledge tested in use,
and where such knowledge is absent, to seek it on the basis of some other
existing knowledge. For Hu Shih, the only alternative to this is a
superstitious supernaturalism that only causes harm.
Though his interpretation of pragmatism as method has considerable
support from Dewey’s writings, Hu Shih sometimes exaggerated Dewey’s
own emphasis on method. Referring to Dewey’s 1907 ‘‘What Pragmatism
Means by Practical,’’ he claimed that ‘‘Dewey, from beginning to end,
12 Wu Zhihui is a member of a Paris group of overseas Chinese intellectuals who were
self-styled materialists, espousing anarchism (Goldman and Lee 2002, 71).
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only recognized pragmatism as a method’’ (Hu 1996, 2:261). What
Dewey proposed was to ‘‘regard pragmatism as primarily a method’’
(1976–83, 4:99). Moreover, Hu either overlooked or neglected to point
out that methods or means are never separate from ends in Dewey’s
philosophy (1976–83, 9:112–13, 14:27–29; 1981–91, 12:490–91, 13:211–
16; Tiles 1988, 157–61). Given the reciprocity of means and ends, it is not
surprising that despite his almost exclusive emphasis on method, Hu
‘‘borrowed from Dewey much more than the mere formulation of an
intellectual methodology’’ (Grieder 1970, 115). While Hu pointed out
that Dewey’s visit to China gave his Chinese audience ‘‘no speciﬁc
proposals . . . such as communism, anarchism, or free love . . . [but] a
philosophical method which enabled [them], through its use, to solve
[their] own special problems’’ (1996, 1:277), Dewey personiﬁed for many
in those audiences not only ‘‘Mr. Science’’ but also ‘‘Mr. Democracy.’’13
In maintaining ‘‘that the greatest responsibility of mankind today, and its
greatest need, is to apply the scientiﬁc method to the problems of human
life’’ (Hu 1996, 2:287), Hu Shih himself believed that this is the means to
the end of democracy that he shared with Dewey.
Means of Democracy: Education or Politics?
Dewey’s lectures in China centered on ‘‘democracy,’’ ‘‘scientiﬁc method,’’
and ‘‘education’’; his Chinese students who arranged his visit hoped that
his educational philosophy would ‘‘awaken the [Chinese] people, so
everyone would become engaged in fundamental educational reforms.’’14
Educational reform was at the center of the cultural renewal that they
believed would bring about democracy in China. This is broadly in line
with Dewey’s thinking. Dewey was often concerned that too much
emphasis was put on ‘‘political democracy,’’ which he found least
inspiring, and not enough thought given to democracy as ‘‘the very idea
of community life itself’’ (1981–91, 2:325–28). In traditional Chinese
culture, Hu Shih saw formidable obstacles to Deweyan democracy. He
was not wrong about the importance of culture, which remains relevant
to today’s pragmatist discourse. James Tiles (1997) recognizes that
Dewey’s moral ideal is ‘‘democracy as culture’’; Richard Shusterman
(1997, 83–87) and Rorty debate ‘‘the continuity of cultural politics with
real politics’’ and the relevance of the former to democracy.
13 ‘‘Mr. Science’’ and ‘‘Mr. Democracy’’ were slogans that had been popular among
liberal reformers in China since 1915; for use of the terms after that, see Chow 1960, 59, 293,
300, 328–33. On the debate about science and its relationship to the issue of ‘‘East versus
West’’ in China’s modernization, see Grieder 1970, chapter 5.
14 Hu and Chiang 1920, 592; Keenan 1977, 55. On Hu’s early commitment to reformism
based on education, see Hu 2000, 584, 592, 599, and Hu 1931, 249.
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Education plays a key role in nurturing the culture of democracy.
‘‘Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and education is the
midwife’’ (Dewey 1976–83, 10:139). Dewey himself considered Democ-
racy and Education the work in which his philosophy is most fully
expounded (1981–91, 5:156). Throughout his career he believed that
‘‘education is the most fundamental method of social progress and
reform’’ (1967–72, 5:93), ‘‘the most far-reaching and the most funda-
mental way of correcting social evils and meeting social issues’’ (1981–91,
5:297). Education is the means by which culture is transmitted from
generation to generation. A society’s education determines what kind of
tradition it passes on to the next generation: a vital and growing tradition
or a dead and stultifying one? Those whom we educate will be the leaders
and citizens of the future, what they are taught and the habits they
acquire through education are going to inﬂuence how they relate to one
another and organize their society.
Hu Shih was among those Chinese intellectuals who believed that the
disappointing results of the 1911 revolution that overthrew the Manchu
dynasty showed that adopting Western political institutions alone was
insufﬁcient to achieve a democratic polity; there was also a need for a
revolution ‘‘in political spirit and educational principles,’’ a new
culture.15 Democracy in China required new attitudes, a new way of
thinking, which Hu argued required ‘‘studying problems and importing
western theories.’’ This new thinking adopted a critical attitude to current
situations as well as Chinese traditions, sorting out China’s cultural
heritage to see what should be preserved and developed, and what should
be discarded, to bring about a ‘‘transvaluation of all values’’ and
‘‘recreation of civilization’’ (Hu 1996, 1:527–34). From his student days,
Hu (2000, 584, 592) was convinced that ‘‘Good government cannot be
secured without certain necessary prerequisites. . . . It is our business to
provide for those necessary prerequisites’’Fto ‘‘create new causes
(zaoyin),’’ and ‘‘the proper way of creating causes at the present time
lies in the cultivation of men. This properly depends upon education.’’
Hu’s reformism after his return to China was grounded in this attitude:
‘‘Come what may, let us educate the people. Let us lay a foundation for
our future generations to build upon’’ (Hu 2000, 599).
15 Sun 1999, 72; see also Hu 1919, 350, and Dewey 1976–83, 12:24. This belief is central
to the New Culture movement, ofﬁcially inaugurated by the publication of the New Youth in
1915; Hu Shih’s contributions to this magazine made him a celebrity in China even before
his return from overseas. The New Culture movement later became more popularly known
as the May Fourth movement. According to Benjamin Schwartz, ‘‘May Fourth simply
marked an explosive stage in the expansion (already underway) of the themes of the New
CultureFparticularly its ‘totalistic’ rejection of the cultural heritage’’ (Goldman and Lee
2002, 118). There is considerable variety in views among New Culture intellectuals; Hu
Shih’s rejection of the cultural heritage was certainly not ‘‘totalistic.’’
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This emphasis on education seems well justiﬁed by the students’ key
role in the Tiananmen demonstrations on May Fourth, 1919, in protest
against the Chinese government’s humiliating policies toward Japan.16
The movement that took its name from that momentous day in Chinese
history is a multifaceted phenomenon that encapsulated much of the
intellectual upsurge and sociopolitical ferment of Chinese society in those
years. Its repercussions continue to be felt today. Democracy movements
in China of the past few decades self-consciously associated themselves
with its spirit; scholars continue to debate its nature and signiﬁcance. Hu
Shih initially welcomed the May Fourth movement as an important
milestone in China’s search for a new culture. As the movement became
more and more politicized, many who were initially united behind it
parted ways. Hu Shih opposed the increasingly radical student activism,
which he felt was interfering with the students’ education. He tried to
discourage political involvement that appeared to be mostly about
ideology, with often unclear or short-term political goals, and prevented
rather than aided inquiry. Hu argued that they should not even discuss
politics, let alone engage in political activities, for at least twenty years.17
It is one thing to recognize that cultural change through education is
of primary importance to democracy, quite another to exclude everything
else, especially political action. Part of the problem is the ambiguous
meaning of ‘‘politics.’’ What Hu rejected is the realpolitik of power
struggle among the warlords and political factions. Hence he described
the May Fourth incident as a triumph of ‘‘non-political forces’’ (Hu 1919,
350). But if politics more generally understood consists of the activities of
governing and being governed, then democratic participation through
social inquiry would also count as politics. There is no avoiding such
politics and yet remaining committed to the democratic cause. The two
forms of political involvement are not mutually exclusive. In some
circumstances social inquiry may be impossible, realpolitik inevitable.
16 The decision at the Versailles Peace Conference to honor secret wartime agreements
among Japan, France, Great Britain, and Italy to grant Japan the former German-occupied
areas in Shantung seemed to the demonstrators a ﬂagrant denial of the new Wilsonian
principles of open diplomacy and self-determination. More than three throusand students
participated in the demonstrations, which began peacefully but ended in violence. More
than a thousand students were arrested. The student demonstrators garnered so much
support among the Chinese public that the arrested students were allowed to march
victoriously out of jail, and the Chinese government was forced to compromise its domestic
and foreign policies. For the best detailed account of the May Fourth movement, see Chow
1960. See also Goldman and Lee 2002, 65–141.
17 Hu 1959, 193–99. Keenan (1977, 68–70) wondered if the New Culture reformers were
following the Confucian advice to stay out of politics when the way did not prevail in the
world. The Confucian position on this issue is at best ambivalent; Confucius himself did not
subscribe to any ﬁxed doctrine on this, and later in his life he was personally willing to serve
even those whose ethical credentials were dubious in the hope of bringing about a better
society (Analects 17.5, 17.7, 18.8).
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Even had educators and students wanted to leave power politics alone,
the politicians would not leave education alone. The dualism of education
and politics was untenable from the start. Education does not take place
in a vacuum. First, the availability of resources for education depends on
politics. Second, what happens outside the school enhances or detracts
from what students learn in school, and what they learn in school, if it is
effective, will and should affect their behavior outside the school. The
social consequences of education ensure that politicians who wish to
gain control over society will want to control education. Hu Shih and
others who eschewed politics learnt from bitter experience that without
political power, education reforms had little chance of success in their
circumstances.
Since the new education Hu Shih advocated was aiming to create
participants of a future democracy, it seems self-contradictory to expect
students to abstain from politics in the atmosphere of the timeFwhen
the country was facing multiple crises on so many fronts and its very
survival seemed to be at stakeFespecially when politics, as Dewey (1973,
47) recognized, was the instrument to diagnose and cure society’s ills. If
the students could remain unmoved and politically ‘‘neutral,’’ they would
be too apathetic to be promising members, let alone creators, of a
participatory democracy. A dualism of education and politics is contrary
to pragmatic epistemology and education philosophy in which learning
and doing are not merely related externally in a linear causal relation;
they are internally related, so that one learns as one acts and one acts as
one learns. Despite its best intentions, Chinese education in the aftermath
of May Fourth could not rise above the partisan fray. Given its explicit
aim to create the cultural basis for a democracy, the new education Hu
Shih advocated could not claim ‘‘political neutrality’’ insofar as the
political parties were for or against democracy, and therefore saw the new
education as favoring or threatening their goals. All these became only
too clear as education reforms in 1920s China were beset with ﬁnancial
problems, interference from the militarists and the Kuomintang,
pressures on both educators and students to take sides in the partisan
struggles, and the vicious circle between student activism and suppression
by the authorities.
According to Keenan (1977, 76), the education reformers’ strategy was
faced with an inherent dilemma: ‘‘political reform was possible only
through deeper cultural reform; but cultural reform itself could not get
started until political conditions were changed.’’ In Dewey’s own words,
‘‘No political reforms of China without education; but no development of
schools as long as military men and corrupt ofﬁcials divert funds and
oppose schools from motives of self-interest’’ (1976–83, 13:231). The
problem need not be intractable. The dilemma misunderstands the
relationship among education, culture, and politics. By ﬁrst thinking of
the connection in terms of linear causality and then turning it into a
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closed vicious circle, a ‘‘chicken or egg’’ problem is invented. The
connection is in fact not viciously circular but spiral, and entry is possible
at different pointsFan intelligent analysis of the situation should reveal
the best points of attack and the best means. There is nothing inherent in
the pragmatist method that requires social transformation to start only
from educational reforms. The importance of education in bringing
about democracy does not preclude other means. Dewey frequently
stressed the need to change the economic and social conditions of his time
through political action if democracy as a culture were to become a
reality (1981–91, 6:43–48). Without supportive political action, education
could achieve little, if anything at all.
Rather than proving that Dewey’s ideas were inapplicable, Hu Shih in
insisting on educational reforms without politics parted company with his
mentor.18 Hu himself was unable to adhere strictly to his own policy
forswearing politics, admitting that, as ‘‘a pragmatist,’’ he was compelled
by circumstances to ‘‘speak out about politics’’ (Hu 1996, 2:331). Dewey
did not blindly endorse his followers’ strategy even though he did his best
to help them. He commented in 1921, ‘‘Chinese educated youth cannot
permanently forswear their interest in direct political action’’ (1976–83,
13:119). In Dewey’s theory and practice, politics and education are
integrated in the endeavor to bring about democracy.19 Dewey endorsed
Hu’s strategic exclusion of political involvement only to the extent that
the politics in question was of a variety that still awaited reconstruction if
it was to contribute to democratization. It was not political activism
per se that they objected to but activism that made activists the pawns of
partisan power struggles without advancing democracy. But perhaps
both Dewey and Hu underestimated the educative function of May
Fourth political activism, which was arguably an exercise in democratic
politics itself, even if it was unsuccessful in transforming China into a
democratic state.
Dewey might disagree, given his misgivings about the movement’s
inherent emotionalism, which he saw as preventing intelligent action and
constructive reforms (Dewey 1973, 301). But he did not advocate
eliminating emotion completely, an impossibility in any case. He
emphasized the need to put it under the control of intelligence. Critics
thought that this permitted only gradualist reform measures, excluding
all ‘‘sudden or revolutionary change’’ (Keenan 1977, 151; Meisner 1967,
18 An early incident recorded in Hu’s published diaries perhaps indicates their different
attitudes toward certain kinds of political activities. Witnessing Dewey’s direct involvement
with the suffragettes’ campaigning in 1915, Hu commented, ‘‘Alas, a scholar of the twentieth
century should not act thus!’’ (Hu 2000, 576; Grieder 1970, 54).
19 Cf. Dewey’s handling of the conﬂict brought on by the challenge of two radical
factions in the Teachers Union, Local 5, of the American Federation of Teachers in 1933
(Eldridge 1998, 91–96).
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105). It was this gradualism, so they argued, that rendered Dewey’s ideas
irrelevant to China after 1919Fa society ripe for revolution and too
unstable to be responsive to problem-oriented gradualism. Most of those
in favor of revolution in China during the 1920sFand many others
besidesFwere looking for a totalistic solution to China’s problems.
Dewey did not, any more than Hu Shih, believe in such a ‘‘fundamental
solution,’’ and it certainly could not be found in some dogmatic ‘‘ism.’’ It
was this piecemeal approach, the refusal to offer salvation in toto, that
cost Hu the support of his erstwhile colleagues in the May Fourth
movement. Considering the subsequent damaging effects of dogmatism
on Chinese society, Hu’s warning about isms seems signiﬁcant and far-
sighted in retrospect (Chow 1960, 218–20).
Experimental Politics
An increasing number of intellectuals in the 1920s perceived a populist
revolution as a ‘‘fundamental solution’’ that would achieve the basic
structural changes Chinese society needed in order to improve China’s
very dire situation. Alarmed by the increasing popularity of Marxism,
Anarchism, and other doctrines offering such a ‘‘fundamental solution,’’
Hu Shih called for ‘‘more studies of problems and less talk of isms’’ in the
summer of 1919, initiating a debate over the right approach to social and
political change. Hu’s opponent in the debate, Li Ta-chao (1888–1927),
agreed with his rejection of mere theory or, worse, unthinking repetition
of slogans and doctrines detached from practice. But Li insisted that
‘‘ism’’ raised consciousness and provided wider contexts for problems,
‘‘an idealism’’ and a ‘‘common direction’’ that motivated people,
enabling more thorough and far-sighted solutions (Hu 1996, 1:260–65).
In Hu’s view, talk of isms at the time risked ‘‘rendering people
complacent, leading them to believe that they had found a ‘fundamental
solution’ that could cure all ills, and no longer needed to study how to
solve concrete problems’’ (Hu 1996, 1:253). Both responses to isms are
likely. The tragedy of the times is that the masses who found isms
attractive were most likely to react the way Hu feared, while others lost
sight of the larger picture in their anxiety to emphasize concrete problems
at the expense of isms. Hu himself had nothing against isms as thinking
tools; he argued that all ideas and theories should be instruments in
thinking, in solving concrete problems, and he adopted the ﬁve stages of
‘‘thinking’’ in Dewey’s How to Think as his proposed method to solve
China’s concrete problems, such as ‘‘the livelihood of the rickshaw
drivers, the limits of Presidential power, prostitution, corruption and
treason, China’s entry into the League of Nations, the liberation of
women, and the liberation of men’’ (Hu 1996, 1:252–53). Admitting that
experimentalism is also an ism, he nevertheless insisted that ‘‘experi-
mentalism is only a method for the study of problems’’ (Hu 1996, 2:332).
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Here again, he apparently ignored the reciprocity of means and ends.
Dewey’s pragmatism is not ‘‘only a method’’Fit is the method for
achieving democracy, the idea of community life that could best attain
growth for everybody, the only moral end. The experimental method of
social inquiry is itself constitutive of Deweyan democracy.
Hu Shih sometimes implied that democracy is dispensable if it proves
to be less than useful in the study of concrete problems (Hu 1996, 1:271).
Consistent with his emphasis on method, he avoided throwing that word
around, and criticized its use as a slogan for being too general (1:527).
Understanding pragmatism as primarily a method means recognizing
that, however central to Dewey’s philosophy, democracy is also open to
question, its content continuously subject to modiﬁcation and recon-
struction. If Hu’s experimental method extends to the end of democracy,
it was not thorough enough to treat his own reformism as a hypothesis;
his continued insistence on the priority of education and cultural reforms
over political action became more and more like a dogma. He did not go
far enough in applying Dewey’s method of thinking as problem solving.
The last stage of actually testing a selected solution is as much another
beginning as an end. Before the testing can yield a verdict of ‘‘success’’ or
‘‘failure’’Fsuch conclusive results may never be availableFconse-
quences of every step taken must be constantly monitored. The addi-
tional information received should initiate further inquiry that may require
reconceptualization of the problem, the end(s) in view, and therefore the
solution. From the various historical accounts, Hu Shih apparently did not
subject his reformist approach to such continual inquiry.
An experimental politics should recognize that the means that are
most appropriate in a situation must be determined speciﬁcally, and that
to rule out revolution beforehand would be as dogmatic as insisting on its
inevitability. Dewey himself was not always averse to advocating
revolution. Believing that the United States was in the ‘‘third great
crisis’’ in its history, he told his fellow Americans in 1933 that they had to
‘‘make the choice between a continuation of anarchy, disguised and
externally suppressedFfor a timeFby what is called Fascism, leading to
inevitable catastrophe, and a political revolution by which the people will
resume powerFthat is to say, not tinkering with the details of legislation
and administration but taking over the means of power’’ (1981–91, 9:77–
78, 296–98). In the discussions following the publication of ‘‘Our Political
Proposals’’ in the Endeavor , Hu Shih also hinted at a ﬂexible
attitude: ‘‘It would be best to combine both approaches, reform what can
be reformed. . . . When faced with that which is beyond reform, or when
forces of evil deliberately prevent reforms, then it is necessary to adopt
revolutionary means’’ (Hu 1996, 2:304). But on another occasion, he
claimed that ‘‘experimentalism developed from Darwinism and conse-
quently can recognize only gradual and continuous reform as true and
dependable progress’’ (Hu 1996, 4:453).
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Hu’s apparent contradiction reveals an ambiguity in the meaning of
‘‘revolution.’’ He might be temperamentally disinclined to revolutionary
activities, such as subversive or violent overthrow of those in power; but
as a pragmatist, he could not categorically rule these out as means of
political change. What he could deny is the claim of a complete break
with the past implied by some of his opponents’ view of revolution as a
‘‘fundamental solution.’’ Revolution in the ﬁrst sense and evolution are
not mutually exclusive; revolution in the second sense is impossible. In his
1929 ‘‘Which Road Shall We Take?’’ Hu argued that political revolutions
were part of the historical evolution of respective societies (Hu 1996, 4:
311). This is not very different from Dewey’s own understanding. To
George Geiger’s questionF‘‘Can the gradualness and tentativeness
insisted upon by Dewey operate during crises?’’FDewey responded,
‘‘The idea that the resolution of a crisis is of the same abrupt nature as is
the occurrence of the crisis is a Utopian confusion. A revolutionary event
is a crisis of high intensity. But the idea that the revolution in its
immediate occurrence, as of a given date, 1789 or 1917/18, is anything
more than the beginning of a gradual process is a case of Utopian self-
delusion’’ (1981–91, 14:76).
A revolution is both the beginning of a gradual process and the end of
another gradual process. Even Karl Marx acknowledged that revolutions
are gradual in an important senseF‘‘new, higher relations of produc-
tion never appear before the material conditions of their existence
have matured in the womb of the old society’’ (Bottomore and Rubel
1963, 68). While Hu Shih and Dewey were not against radical changes,
they did not believe in ‘‘revolutionary changes’’ that break completely
with the pastFthese are neither possible nor desirable. The mis-
placed denial of the inherent continuity of experience even in the midst
of the most drastic discontinuities would only lead to the destruction
of not only obsolete customs and institutions but also the values
those customs and institutions were originally intended to serve, values
that may still be relevant to the new situation. Such revolutions are
expensive and wasteful. In contrast, intelligent methods of problem
solving bring about radical changes more effectively and efﬁciently
(Dewey 1973, 87).
While not against revolution in the sense of radical changes, Hu Shih
was adamant that what China needed was not ‘‘the revolution of violent
despotism’’ or the revolution that ‘‘ﬁghts violence with violence’’ (Hu
1996, 4:314). It remains a serious problem today whether we can solve
any human problem through violence, or will such ‘‘solutions’’ only bring
more problems, more devastation? How should pragmatists respond to
such acts of violence as terrorism and war? Dewey’s support for U.S.
participation in World War I remains problematic for pragmatists.
Whether or not he considered it a mistake, what is more important is
that, true to his pragmatism, Dewey learnt from that experience, which
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signiﬁcantly changed his views about war as a means to democracy. One
lesson he drew is ‘‘the impotency and harmfulness of any and every ideal
that is proclaimed wholesale and in the abstract . . . the tragic need for
the more realistic study of forces and consequences, a study conducted in
a more scientiﬁcally accurate and complete manner than that of the
professed Real-politik’’ (1976–83, 12:154). Unfortunately, such studies
were not taken up by Hu ShihFinstead, Hu’s later ‘‘studies of problems’’
seem more of a retreat into the ivory tower than democratic engagement.
The failure of Hu’s reformism lies more in his choice of problems to study
than in the pragmatist advocacy of problem solving and intelligent
practice in place of revolutionary violence.
Dewey’s later views on violence are much closer to Hu Shih’s. Writing
about the need for liberalism to advocate radical change in order to
remain relevant in the 1930s, he basically afﬁrmed Hu’s earlier rejection
of violence:
But radicalism also means, in the minds of many, both supporters and
opponents, dependence upon the use of violence as the main method of
effecting drastic changes. Here the liberal parts company. For he is committed
to the organization of intelligent action as the chief method. [1981–91, 11:45]
In this respect, Hu was a true Deweyan liberal. Even though Dewey felt
World War II showed that the lessons of the earlier war had not been
learnt, he nevertheless held out hope in 1939 that ‘‘there are dependable
signs that both abroad and in this country, belief in war and sheer force
as the source of production for needed social changes has suffered
greatly. There is even a possibility that belief in war as an agency for this
end will have received a mortal wound by the time the war is over’’
(1981–91, 14:249). The world at the beginning of this new millennium
belies Dewey’s optimism.
The Unﬁnished Experiment of Chinese Democracy
I am inclined to agree with Dewey that ‘‘if destructive wars continue to be
resorted toFas they may beFit will be because of outright relapse into
barbarism and not as an agency for civilization and culture’’ (1981–91,
14:249). In the light of this, it is easier to sympathize with Hu Shih’s
resistance to political action that was likely to lead to violence. Hu did
not ‘‘revolt against existing authority,’’ but not because he accepted ‘‘the
undemocratic operation of the militarist politics,’’ if acceptance implies
condoning it. Critics underestimate the radical possibilities of pragma-
tism, even in China. Contrary to Keenan’s belief (1977, 150), experi-
mentalism need not have ‘‘accepted the given environment in which it
could begin its chemistry of attitudinal re-orientation, social education
and egalitarian participation.’’ If a revolt against the existing authority
would have beneﬁted democracy, would have created the modern human
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civilization Hu yearned for, employing Dewey’s experimental method
would not have precluded such a revoltFwhich would not be merely an
impulsive outbreak of violence but would constitute an intelligent use of
force. What Dewey’s experimentalism led Hu Shih to reject was an
undemocratic power struggle that might ensure short-term political
victory only at the cost of the eventual defeat of democracy. As Grieder
remarked, ‘‘Had the liberals acted upon the advice that has so often been
proffered retrospectively, they would not have remained liberals’’
(Grieder 1972, 96). If there had been a way to win the power contest
without betraying democracy in China, Dewey’s experimentalism would
not have prevented Hu from ﬁnding it. Did Hu miss it because of his own
political ineptitude or was the way simply not there?
Hu’s attempt to realize Dewey’s pragmatism in China may not have
succeeded in bringing about democracy, but we should not overlook the
democratic signiﬁcance and far-reaching effect of certain aspects of the
education and cultural reforms he and others initiated. One important
achievement is the switch to the vernacular language, which makes
universal literacy an achievable goal that would make education more
accessible to all and develop the means of communication and publicity
required for democracy (Chow 1960, 363). Despite the political defeat of
its democratic aspirations, the May Fourth movement left an indelible
imprint on Chinese civilization through its promotion of vernacular
literature. A considerable part of this literature shares democratic
perspectives. Its criticism of several aspects of Chinese traditional society,
which were in sore need of change, has been instrumental in reforming
social institutions like the family and changing attitudes on the social
position of women, among other issues (Chow 1960, 257–59). The values
Hu Shih promoted have not been lost with the political defeat of the
reformers who advocated education before politicsFthese values may
yet play an important role in the future of China. If political defeat at the
time was the price of preserving the integrity of the movement, of
remaining true to those democratic values, then perhaps Hu Shih was not
so misguided in his strategy after all. It did not open up a direct route to
democracy, but it might yet contribute something to continued attempts
in China to ﬁnd a way to democracy.
If Hu Shih seems a little selective in his presentation and interpretation
of pragmatism, we must remember that he was promoting Dewey’s
philosophy even as Dewey was still developing it. Moreover, from
a pragmatist perspective, his mentor’s views are not absolute truths;
rather, they are tools to be used appropriately in the circumstances. It
is to be expected that these tools will undergo some changes as they
are tested in new situations. My tentative assessment, to be challenged
or corroborated by more research, is that Hu Shih was an important
pragmatist. His status in the history of pragmatism matters because his
attempt to realize pragmatism as a philosophical method to solve human
r Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
CHINA’S PRAGMATIST EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY 61
problems in China has something to teach us, as pragmatists and as
human beings.
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